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Abstract. Privacy-preserving digital credentials are cryptographic tools
that allow a user to prove a predicate about his/her identity or qualiﬁca-
tions, without the verifying party learning additional information beyond
the status of that predicate. The Identity Mixer (Idemix) [CL01] is a
framework providing such credentials. In Idemix, we can distinguish two
types of credentials: (1) one-time show credentials which can be shown
only once before unveiling the identity of their holder, and (2) multi-
show credentials which can be shown inﬁnitely many times without the
showings being linked to each other, or to the identity of their holder. In
this paper, we bridge the gap between the two previous types of creden-
tials, and extend Idemix to k-show credentials (for k>1.) The k-show
credentials we propose can be shown anonymously, but linkably, up to
k times.
Keywords: Privacy-preserving digital credentials, anonymity, multiple-
show credentials.
1 Introduction
With the increasing digitization of society, and the continuous migration of day-
to-day services from the paper world to the digital world, digital credentials
have become a very important tool. Similar to their paper counterparts, digital
credentials are special documents, issued by a certiﬁcation authority, that may
contain a variety of information about their holder (e.g., identity attributes, qual-
iﬁcations, privileges, etc.) In addition, digital credentials have attractive features,
that make them superior to their paper counterparts, such as searchability, large-
scale data-mining, and knowledge discovery, just to name a few. With the latter
features, comes also the disadvantage that credential holders are now a lot easier
to monitor, and to have their privacy violated. Furthermore, digital credentials –
by their very nature – are easy to clone and copy, and using them without proper
safeguards could lead to serious security problems. To address this set of conﬂict-
ing requirements, namely privacy and security requirements, privacy-preserving
credentials have been invented [Cha85, CP92, Bra94, Bra00, CL01, CL04]. In a
privacy-preserving digital credential system, one can generally distinguish three
types of players: a certiﬁcation authority, a user, and a veriﬁer. In some cases,
the certiﬁcation authority and the veriﬁer are controlled by the same entity. The
certiﬁcation authority issues a credential to a user who fulﬁlls certain condi-
tions. In exchange for goods and services, the user may be required to prove,
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to a service provider (the veriﬁer), possession of a valid credential from the cer-
tiﬁcation authority. The user may also be required to prove a predicate on the
attributes encoded in his credential. The service provider may later decide to
deposit a transcript of the interaction it had with the user, to the certiﬁcation
authority. The main requirements the credential system should satisfy are: (1)
Non-forgeability: the user should not be able to succeed in proving the validity
of forged credentials, or in proving predicates that are not satisﬁed by the at-
tributes encoded on his CA-issued credential, and (2) Privacy: the veriﬁer should
not be able to learn any information about the user’s credentials beyond what
can be naturally inferred from the status of the proven predicate. The latter
requirement can be reﬁned even further, by adding constraints on the number of
times a credential can be used. Based on this last criterion, we can distinguish
three types of credentials:
1. Multiple-show credentials: they can be shown inﬁnitely-many times without
the showings being linked to each other, or to the issuing protocol instance
where they were generated.
2. One-show credentials: they can be shown anonymously only once, before the
identity of their holder is unveiled.
3. Limited- or k-show credentials, for (k>1): they can be shown anonymously
up to k times, after which the identity of the holder is revealed.
Privacy-preserving credential systems are becoming increasingly popular, and
there is a growing interest in concrete implementations [Ide07, UPr07, Hig07].
The Identity Mixer [Ide07] is based on Camenisch and Lysyanskaya’s credentials
[CL01], and is one of today’s most complete credential systems. Idemix provides
a framework supporting only the ﬁrst two types of credentials, namely multi-
show credentials, and one-time show credentials.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we bridge the gap between the two ﬁrst
types of credentials, and extend the Idemix framework to k-show credentials
(for k>1.) A naive way to construct k-show credentials is by issuing k separate
copies of one-show credentials, but this option obviously lacks eﬃciency. The
solution we propose in this paper extends the one-time show credentials of [CL01]
to k-show credentials without a signiﬁcant increase in complexity. Compared to
the protocols of [CL01], we only add 2 extra exponentiations and 1 proof of
discrete logarithm knowledge to the user in the pseudonym creation protocol.
For the issuing protocol, the user performs 3 more exponentiantions and a proof
of knowledge for each additional showing allowed. Finally, the complexity of the
showing protocol can be made very close to that of one-time show credentials
[CL01] by using precomputations and fast exponentitation methods [Gor98].
Anonymous k-show credentials may be used in a variety of applications. They
can be used for instance to build public transit passes, where a user is allowed
to make up to k rides anonymously, after which the pass serial number will be
uncovered, revoked, and added to a black list. In order to count the number
of times a credential is shown, the issuing organization is able to link diﬀerent
showings of the same credential to each other, but not to the identity of theAnonymous k-Show Credentials 183
credential holder, or for that matter, to the instance of the issuing protocol
that generated the credential. This linking feature can also be found in the
one-show credentials of [CL01] and [Bra94] where issuers rely on it to detect
double-spending. The work in [LTW05] follows the same principle to recover
lost electronic cash.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give an
overview of the basic credential system of [CL01], as well as the general setting. In
section 3 we present our extension to k-show credentials. In section 4, we position
our contribution with respect to related work. We conclude in section 5.
2 Review of the Idemix Credential System
2.1 General Setting
There are two main types of players in the Idemix system: users and organi-
zations. Organizations oﬀer both material (e.g., goods) and non-material (e.g.,
assertions) services to users. To provide those services, organizations require
users to fulﬁll certain conditions. These conditions may include paying a fee, ful-
ﬁlling a predicate about one’s identity, or proving possession of an authorization
from some recognized authority. More generally, this process consists in showing
one or a set of credentials.
Users in turn want to beneﬁt from those services without revealing unneces-
sary information about their identity. To remain anonymous, each user U pos-
sesses a diﬀerent pseudonym N(U,Oi) with each organization Oi. For example,
if an organization O1 requires a user U to show that he has a valid credential
from organization O2,t h e nU should be able to do so without O1 and O2 being
capable of linking his pseudonyms N(U,O1) and N(U,O2). This property is called
unlinkability. It should also be possible for user U to show a credential he ob-
tained from organization O without O being able to retrace that credential back
to the protocol instance where the credential was issued. This property is called
untraceability.
In the Idemix system [CL01], a user U ﬁrst registers with an organization
O and obtains a pseudonym N(U,O), and a validating tag P(U,O) on it. The
validating tag allows the user to prove that he actually owns the pseudonym.
Next, user U obtains a credential from organization O. The credential is a pair
denoted (c(U,O),e (U,O)), such that c
e(U,O)
(U,O) = P(U,O)dO,w h e r edO is a system
parameter. Later, user U can prove to a verifying organization V that he holds
a valid credential from organization O without either revealing the credential
(c(U,O),e (U,O)) or his pseudonym N(U,O) with organization O.
The Idemix framework is based on the strong RSA assumption and the deci-
sions Diﬃe-Hellman assumption modulo a safe prime product.
In the following we begin with an overview of the system parameters. Then
we give a brief description of the pseudonym generation protocol, the credential
issuing protocol, and the credential showing protocol.184 M. Layouni and H. Vangheluwe
2.2 System Parameters and Notations
All RSA moduli used in the system are of length  n. Let the intervals
Γ =] − 2 Γ,2 Γ[, Δ =] − 2 Δ,2 Δ[, and Λ =] − 2 Λ,2 Λ+ Σ[ be such that  Δ =
 ( Λ + n)+1,where >1 is a security parameter, and  Λ >  Σ + Δ +4.Eac h
organizationO chooses a safe prime product modulus nO and keeps the factoriza-
tion secret. It also chooses random elements aO,b O,d O,g O,h O,v O,z O ∈ QRnO
and publishes them along with nO. The parameter  Λ is chosen such that com-
puting discrete logarithms in QRnO with  Λ-bits exponents is hard.
In the remainder of this paper, PK{(α,β,···):P(A,B,···;α,β,···)},d e -
notes, for public parameters A,B,···, a proof of knowledge of secrets α,β,···,
for which the public predicate P(···) is satisﬁed.
2.3 Establishing a Pseudonym with an Organization
Let U be a user who wants to establish a pseudonym with organization O.
Let xu ∈ Γ be U’s master secret key (or ID). The protocol shown in ﬁgure 1
allows U to obtain a pseudonym N(U,O) and a validating tag P(U,O) such that
P(U,O) = a
xu
O b
s(U,O)
O ,w h e r es(U,O) is jointly chosen by U and O. Organization O
learns nothing about the values of xu and s(U,O).
2.4 Obtaining a Credential from an Organization
Organization O can issue a credential to user U who proves ownership of a
previously established pseudonym and validating tag (N(U,O),P (U,O)). The cre-
dential is a pair (c(U,O),e (U,O)) ∈ Z∗
nO ×Λ such that P(U,O)dO = c
e(U,O)
(U,O) .F i g u r e2
describes how the issuing protocol works.
2.5 Showing a Credential to an Organization
User U can prove to any verifying organization V that he possesses a valid
credential from organization O.I nt h i sp r o o fV does not learn anything about
the user’s pseudonym with O, the credential he holds from O, or the secrets
underlying that credential. Figure 3 explains how the show protocol works for
one-time show credentials. Showing multiple-show credentials is simpler and can
be easily derived.
If user U shows his one-time show credential more than once, organization
O will have two challenge-response pairs (c1,r 1)a n d( c2,r 2), from which it can
retrieve xu and s(U,O), which in turn will determine P(U,O) and identify U.
3E x t e n s i o n t o k-Show Credentials
In this section we present an extension of the credential system described above.
In addition to the multiple-show and one-show modes, where credentials can
be spent either inﬁnitely many times or only one time, we now present k-show
credentials, with k>1. k-show credentials can be spent k times without beingAnonymous k-Show Credentials 185
User U Public Info Organization O
nO,a O,b O,d O,g O,h O,v O,z O ∈ QRnO
N1 ∈{ 0,1}
k,
tu,1,r 1,1 ∈R Δ,
tu,2,r 1,2,r u ∈R {0,1}
2 n
Ct = g
tu,1
O h
tu,2
O
C0 := g
xu
O h
ru
O
C1 := g
r1,1
O h
r1,2
O
N1,C0,C1,Ct − −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PK{(α,β,γ,δ,ν,η):C
2
0 =( g
2
O)
α(h
2
O)
β
∧ C
2
1 =( g
2
O)
γ(h
2
O)
δ ∧ C
2
t =( g
2
O)
ν(h
2
O)
η}
N(U,O) := N1||N2
r1,tu,N2 ← −−−−− − r1,t u ∈R Δ and N2
t(U,O) := tu,1 + tu
s(1,U,O) := r1,1 + r1
P(U,O) := a
xu
O b
s(1,U,O)
O z
t(U,O)
O
P(U,O)
− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PK{(α,β,γ,δ,ζ,η,ν):C
2
0 =( g
2
O)
α(h
2
O)
β
∧ C
2
1 =( g
2
O)
γ(h
2
O)
δ
∧ C
2
t =( g
2
O)
ν(h
2
O)
η ∧ C
2
1(g
2
O)
r1 =( g
2
O)
ε(h
2
O)
δ
∧ C
2
t (g
2
O)
tu =( g
2
O)
ζ(h
2
O)
η ∧ P(U,O) := a
α
Ob
ε
Oz
ζ
O}
U stores O stores
N(U,O),P (U,O),P
2
(U,O),N (U,O),P (U,O),P
2
(U,O)
s(1,U,O),t (U,O)
Fig.1. Idemix pseudonym creation protocol
User U Public Info Organization O
nO,a O,b O,d O,g O,h O,v O,z O ∈ QRnO
N(U,O),P(U,O)
− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PK{(α,β,γ,):P2
(U,O):=(a2
O)α(b2
O)β(z2
O)γ}
N(U,O),P (U,O)
?
∈ DB
choose prime e(U,O)∈RΛ
c
e(U,O)
(U,O)
? = P(U,O)dO
c(U,O),e(U,O)
← −−−−−−−− − c(U,O) := (P(U,O)dO)
1/e(U,O)
store c(U,O),e (U,O) store c(U,O),e (U,O)
with N(U,O),P (U,O)
Fig.2. Idemix credential issuing protocol
linked to the instance of the issuing protocol that generated them or to the
identity of their owner. The identity of the owner is revealed only if the credential
is spent more than k times.186 M. Layouni and H. Vangheluwe
User U Public Info Organization O
nO,a O,b O,d O,g O,h O,v O,z O ∈ QRnO
choose r1,r 2 ∈R {0,1}
2 n
A := c(U,O)h
r1
O
B := h
r1
O g
r2
O
H(u,O) := h
t(U,O)
O
A,B,H(u,O)
− −−−−−−− →
c ← − choose c ∈R {0,1}
 c
r := cxu + s(U,O)
r − →
mark credential PK{(α,β,γ,δ,ζ,ξ,ε,ϕ):H(u,O) = h
ϕ
O
as void ∧ d
2
O =( A
2)
α(
1
a2
O
)
β(
1
b2
O
)
γ(
1
z2
O
)
ϕ(
1
h2
O
)
δ
∧ B
2 =( h
2
O)
ε(g
2
O)
ζ ∧ 1=( B
2)
α(
1
h2
O
)
δ(
1
g2
O
)
ξ If accepted
∧ g
r
O = g
γ
O(g
c
O)
β store transcript
∧ β ∈ Γ ∧ γ ∈ Δ ∧ ϕ ∈ Δ ∧ α ∈ Λ} for later checkings
Fig.3. Idemix credential showing protocol (one-time show mode)
For the purpose of credential revocation, an additional party will be added to
the setting. This party is an independent outsider to the system, and is denoted
CA. When showing a credential, a user veriﬁably encrypts a piece of identify-
ing information under the CA’s public key. The encryption also speciﬁes the
condition under which the ciphertext is decrypted. This is achieved using the
Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98].
Additional system parameters. These are parameters to be used in the veriﬁable
encryption scheme. The CA chooses a group G =  g  =  h  of prime order
q>2 Γ. Then he chooses x1,x 2,x 3,x 4,x 5 ∈R Zq and keeps them secret. The
CA then computes the tuple (y1,y 2,y 3): =( gx1hx2,gx3hx4,gx5) and publishes it
as his public key.
3.1 Establishing a Pseudonym with an Organization for Obtaining
Revocable Credentials
This protocol can be used not only for k-show credentials but for multiple-show
credentials as well. It simply gives an organization the necessary information it
could use to identify a user and revoke his credentials in case a certain revocation
condition is fulﬁlled. The protocol is shown on ﬁgure 4.
Several variables are used in this protocol. Following are the roles played by
the most important ones.
– t(U,O) which is only known to the user will be used to link the showings of
the same k-show credential to each other.
– xu is used to identify the usergloballyby the CA. xu is only knownto the user.Anonymous k-Show Credentials 187
User U Public Info Organization O
nO,a O,b O,d O,g O,h O,v O,z O ∈ QRnO
G,g,h,y1,y 2,y 3
N1 ∈{ 0,1}
k,
xu,x (u,O) ∈ Γ
tu,1,r 1,1 ∈R Δ,
tu,2,r 1,2,r u ∈R {0,1}
2 n
Ct = g
tu,1
O h
tu,2
O
C0 := g
xu
O h
ru
O
C1 := g
r1,1
O h
r1,2
O
N1,C0,C1,Ct − −−−−−−−→
PK{(α,β,γ,δ,ν,η):C
2
0 =( g
2
O)
α(h
2
O)
β
∧ C
2
1 =( g
2
O)
γ(h
2
O)
δ ∧ C
2
t =( g
2
O)
ν(h
2
O)
η}
r1,tu,N2 ← −−−−− − r1,t u ∈R Δ and N2
N(U,O) := N1||N2
t(U,O) := tu,1 + tu
s(1,U,O) := r1,1 + r1
P(U,O) := a
xu
O b
s(1,U,O)
O
.z
t(U,O)
O v
x(u,O)
O
If O = CA then
Yu := g
xu
P(U,O),Yu
− −−−−−− →
PK{(α,β,γ,δ,ζ,η,ν,ξ):C
2
0 =( g
2
O)
α(h
2
O)
β
∧ C
2
1 =( g
2
O)
γ(h
2
O)
δ ∧ C
2
1(g
2
O)
r1 =( g
2
O)
ε(h
2
O)
δ
∧ C
2
t =( g
2
O)
ν(h
2
O)
η ∧ C
2
t (g
2
O)
tu =( g
2
O)
ζ(h
2
O)
η
∧ P(U,O) := a
α
Ob
ε
Oz
ζ
Ov
ξ
O ∧ Yu = g
α}
else
Y(u,O) := g
x(u,O)
P(U,O),Y(u,O)
− −−−−−−−−→
PK{(α,β,γ,δ,ζ,η,ν,ξ):C
2
0 =( g
2
O)
α(h
2
O)
β
∧ C
2
1 =( g
2
O)
γ(h
2
O)
δ ∧ C
2
1(g
2
O)
r1 =( g
2
O)
ε(h
2
O)
δ
∧ C
2
t =( g
2
O)
ν(h
2
O)
η ∧ C
2
t (g
2
O)
tu =( g
2
O)
ζ(h
2
O)
η
∧ P(U,O) := a
α
Ob
ε
Oz
ζ
Ov
ξ
O ∧ Y(u,O) = g
ξ}
U stores O stores
N(U,O),P (U,O),P
2
(U,O),N (U,O),P (U,O),P
2
(U,O),
s(1,U,O),t (U,O),Y u or Y(u,O)
Yu or Y(u,O)
Fig.4. Pseudonym creation protocol for revocable k-show credentials
– x(U,O) will be used to identify the user locally at the issuing organization.
x(U,O) is only known to the user.
– Yu can be used only when a user violates the agreement governing the usage
of his credential (e.g., overshowing). Yu allows the CA to reveal a user’s
identity.
– Y(u,O) is similar to Yu, but de-anonymizes the user only locally by revealing
his pseudonym to the issuing organization O.188 M. Layouni and H. Vangheluwe
3.2 Obtaining a k-Show Revocable Credential from an Organization
User U executes the protocol of Figure 5 to obtain a k-show credential with
organization O. The tuple (P(U,O),Q (k,U,O),c (k,U,O),e (k,U,O))i sU’s k-show cre-
dential with organization O. The pseudonym P(U,O) does not depend on k and
can therefore be used both in the multiple-show as well as the k-show setting.
User U Public Info Organization O
nO,a O,b O,d O,g O,h O,v O,z O ∈ QRnO
G,g,h,y1,y 2,y 3
N(U,O),P(U,O)
− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PK{(α,β,γ,ξ):P2
(U,O):=
(a2
O)α(b2
O)β(z2
O)γ(v2
O)ξ}
N(U,O),P (U,O)
?
∈ DB
(ri,1)(2≤i≤k) ∈R Δ,
(ri,2)(2≤i≤k) ∈R {0,1}
2 n
Ci := g
ri,1
O h
ri,2
O (2 ≤ i ≤ k)
Ci (2≤i≤k)
− −−−−−−−−−−−−→
PK{(γi,δi)(2≤i≤k):
C2
i =(g2
O)γi(h2
O)δi}
(ri)( 2 ≤i≤k)
← −−−−−−−− (ri)(2≤i≤k) ∈R Δ
s(i,U,O):=ri,1+ri (2 ≤ i ≤ k)
Q(k,U,O) :=
k Y
i=2
g
s(i,U,O)
O,i
Q(k,U,O),C i (2≤i≤k)
− −−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PK{(γi,δ i,ε i)(2≤i≤k) : C
2
i =( g
2
O)
γi(h
2
O)
δi
∧C
2
i (g
2
O)
ri =( g
2
O)
εi(h
2
O)
δi
∧Q
2
(k,U,O) :=
Qk
i=2(g
2
O,i)
εi}
store {s(i,U,O)}(2≤i≤k) choose prime e(k,U,O)∈RΛ
c
e(k,U,O)
(k,U,O)
? = P(U,O)dOQ(k,U,O)
c(k,U,O),e(k,U,O)
← −−−−−−−−−−− c(k,U,O) :=
`
P(U,O)Q(k,U,O)dO
´1/e(k,U,O)
store c(k,U,O),e (k,U,O),
store Q(k,U,O),c (k,U,O),e (k,U,O)
set counter cnt(U,O): =0 w i t hN(U,O),P (U,O),Y (U,O)
Fig.5. Issuing protocol for revocable k-show credentials
3.3 Showing a Revocable k-Show Credential to an Organization
User U is allowed to show his credential up to k times without the showings
being linked to his identity or to the instance of the issuing protocol by which it
has obtained the credential. Figure 6 describes how the showing protocol works.
3.4 Local User Identiﬁcation and Credential Revocation
A verifying organization V in the showing protocol above, submits the showing
transcript oﬄine to the issuing organization O, which in turn will be able toAnonymous k-Show Credentials 189
User U Public Info Organization O
nO,a O,b O,d O,g O,h O,v O,z O ∈ QRnO
G,g,h,y1,y 2,y 3
if cnt(U,O) ≥ k then quit
else
choose r1,r 2 ∈R {0,1}
2 n
A := c(k,U,O)h
r1
O
B := h
r1
O g
r2
O
H(u,O) := h
t(U,O)
O
A,B,H(u,O)
− −−−−−−− →
c ← − choose c ∈R {0,1}
 c
r := x(u,O) +
k X
i=1
s(i,U,O)c
i r − →
PK{(α,β,(γi)1≤i≤k,δ,ζ,ξ,ε,ϕ,ψ):H(u,O) = h
ϕ
O
∧ d
2
O =( A
2)
α(
1
a2
O
)
β(
1
b2
O
)
γ1(
1
z2
O
)
ϕ(
1
v2
O
)
ψ Qk
i=2(
1
b2
O,i
)
γi(
1
h2
O
)
δ
∧ B
2 =( h
2
O)
ε(g
2
O)ζ ∧ 1=( B
2)
α(
1
h2
O
)
δ(
1
g2
O
)
ξ
∧ g
r
O = g
ψ
O(g
c
O)
γ1(g
c2
O )
γ2 ···(g
ck
O )
γk
∧ β,ψ ∈ Γ ∧ (γi)1≤i≤k ∈ Δ ∧ ϕ ∈ Δ ∧ α ∈ Λ}
If accepted
increment counter store transcript
cnt(U,O): =cnt(U,O) + 1 for later checkings
Fig.6. Showing protocol for revocable k-show credentials
link the user’s showings via H(u,O) without actually identifying his pseudonym.
In case user U shows his credential beyond the allowed threshold k,t h e na n y
party can veriﬁably recover his secret key x(u,O) by interpolating (in the sense
of Lagrange) any subset of (k +1) challenge-response pairs (c,r)t h a tw e r eu s e d
in the showing protocols conducted by the user. Given x(u,O), organization O
computes Y(u,O) = gx(u,O), which will determine user U’s pseudonym N(U,O),a n d
enable the revocation of his credentials. The value of H(u,O), retrieved from the
incriminating transcripts above, is added to a blacklist of revoked credentials,
and used to detect subsequent attempts to show revoked credentials.
3.5 Global User Identiﬁcation and Credential Revocation
Global revocation allows for the identiﬁcation of a user by an external referee to
the system, denoted CA. The conditions leading to the de-anonymization of the
user are negotiated by the verifying organization and the user prior to executing
the show protocol. Once the de-anonymization condition is agreed upon, the user
may proceed with the showing protocol as follows. The user starts by veriﬁably
encrypting a part of his identity (Yu) using the CA’s public key and sends the190 M. Layouni and H. Vangheluwe
ciphertext, along with a proof of correctness, to the verifying organization. The
de-anonymization condition is tied to the encryption, thereby forcing the CA
to only decrypt the ciphertext when this condition is met. We denote this de-
anonymization condition by L. The veriﬁable encryption scheme of Cramer and
Shoup [CS98] is used to achieve this.
To show a credential to verifying organization V ,u s e rU starts by executing
the protocol of Figure 7 with V .B o t hU and V then proceed with the rest of
the show protocol as shown in Figure 6.
User U Public Info Organization O
nO,a O,b O,d O,g O,h O,v O,z O ∈ QRnO
G,g,h,y1,y 2,y 3
choose r ∈R Zq
w1 := g
r,w 2 := h
r
w3 := y
r
3Yu,
w4 := y
r
1y
rH(w1,w2,w3,L)
2
w1,w2,w3,w4 − −−−−−−−→
PK{(α,β,(γi)1≤i≤k,δ,θ,ϕ,ψ):
d
2
O =( A
2)
α(
1
a2
O
)
β(
1
b2
O
)
γ1(
1
z2
O
)
ϕ(
1
v2
O
)
ψ Qk
i=2(
1
b2
O,i
)
γi(
1
h2
O
)
δ
∧ w1 = g
θ ∧ w2 = h
θ ∧ w3 = g
βy
θ
3
∧ w4 =( y1y
H(w1,w2,w3,L)
2 )
θ}
Fig.7. Veriﬁable encryption of a user’s revocation information
Global revocation. When provided with an encryption (w1,w 2,w 3,w 4), a de-
anonymization condition L, and evidence that L is satisﬁed, the CA checks
whether w4
? = w
x1+x3H(w1,w2,w3,L)
1 w
x2+x4H(w1,w2,w3,L)
2 . If this is the case, the
CA computes Yu = w3/w
x5
1 which will determine the identity of user U.
4 Related Work
There have been a number of research eﬀorts on limited-show credentials in the
literature. In the following we list the ones that are most relevant to our work.
In [LTW05], Lui et al., go around the problem of k-show credentials, by making
a user initially ﬁll-up a “wallet” of k coins, each of which can be shown only
once. The identity of the user will be revealed as soon as a given coin is shown
a second time. The work in [LTW05], also provides a mechanism to recognize
and recover lost coins belonging to a given user. In [TFS04, NSN05], the authors
propose constructions allowing users to show their credentials, anonymously and
unlinkably, up to k times. All additional shows will be linked to a subset of
the initial k shows, but the system falls short of identifying the abusers. More
recently, Camenisch et al. [CHK+06] proposed a credential system that allows
a user to anonymously authenticate at most k times within a pre-deﬁned time
period. While the latter represents a signiﬁcant step towards solving the problem
of k-show credentials, it still does not solve it, since users just need to wait untilAnonymous k-Show Credentials 191
the beginning of the next time period, before starting to reuse their credentials
all the way from scratch.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This work extends the Identity Mixer framework to support anonymous k-show
credentials, for k>1. The proposed construction allows a user to show his
credential up to k times, without the verifying or issuing organizations being
able to link the diﬀerent showings to the identity of the credential holder, or to
the instance of the issuing protocol that generated the credential. Similar to the
original framework, the credentials proposed in this work, are revocable both
locally by the issuing organization, and globally by a trusted third party, upon
fulﬁllment of a pre-deﬁned de-anonymization condition.
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